BryndenBFish

Thanks for the AMAA and thanks for your service!

As a Baltimorean (Baltimoron, if you will), I was intrigued by the book Cop in the Hood by Peter Moskos. One of the theories he puts forward is that if drugs were legal, cornerboys, dealers and the like would be less likely to opt towards violence and more likely to seek civil remediation. Do you think that some form of drug legalization or perhaps decriminalization would lead to a decline in violent crime rates in the areas you work in? On a more general level, what methods of policing work best to decrease crime in a particular area or neighborhood? Thanks again!

I did indeed. Was typing against a 5pm deadline, aka, "the end of work" so my question wasn't as full as could be. Thanks for the reading material in the meantime.

Thank you for a great response. I'll try to be non-specifically specific in my answers on improvement and independence of the ANA unit my team and I worked with.

We picked up a unit that had just completed their validation at Kabul Military Training Center. From the time we started training and operating with them to the period of time when we handed them off to another ETT, we found some slight improvements (Tactics, some awareness of COIN, key leaders - especially their NCOs). However, we found that at the end of our tour, we were dealing with some of the same problems that we encountered when we first entered country. Logistics, especially their fuel consumption/allocation, was a continuous problem. Alongside of the fuel issue, was the corruption issue and the lurking question of how much fuel was utilized by the ANA unit and how much of it was being stolen and sold. The final and probably the most troublesome issue was racial tensions among the leadership. The Kandak Commander and Kandak Sergeant Major were both ethnic minorities while some of the Toley (Company) Commanders were Pashtuns. They distrusted each other, and would tell me how x-officer or x-NCO is "Taliban" based solely on their ethnicity.

Independence of Afghan units: They tended to be insufficiently resourced at the Brigade and Division level which impacted their ability to operate effectively and independently outside of the small-unit level (platoon or below). I don't want to say that my experience is indicative of the overall performance of the ANA, though. The best units were pushed to RC East and RC South/Southwest (Helmand) whereas new/bad units tended to operate in areas where the insurgency was weakest (Kabul, RC West). Could the Kandak I worked with stand alone in 2010? No. Some of their leadership didn't lack for enthusiasm, but with corruption, ethnic tension and poor logistics, I don't believe that they're up to the task. All that being said, that was 2 years ago, and I sincerely hope that they're on a much better footing now.

Thanks again for the detailed response.

Mr. Chao, I was an ETT (Embedded Training Team) Commander of a 14-man U.S. Army Team responsible for advising and operating with an ANA infantry kandak in the Kabul area in 2010. One of the things that I found most disheartening about my experience was the pressure that was put on us by our chain of command to evaluate our Afghan partners on a graded scale, namely by inflating their ability to operate effectively and independently of American help. In your experience, did you find that the Marine Embed Teams had pressure put on them to inflate the performance of their ANA partners? Follow-up, could the ANA units that you witnessed conduct their own logistics through their chain of command or were they reliant on the Americans to provide their classes of supply?

Thanks for the AMA. I've enjoyed your responses so far. My question is more a technical one, but I'd enjoy reading your response. Which side of the synoptic problem debate do you fall on? Are you a general proponent of the two-source hypothesis, Augustinian Hypothesis or the newish Four Document Hypothesis in determining the basis for the synoptic gospels? Follow-up: What makes the theory you subscribe to convincing? Thanks again!